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Abstract
We construct a search-theoretic model ` a la Lagos and Wright (2005), that has
multiple steady-state equilibria, one of which may be interpreted as a state of ﬁ-
nancial crisis. The key ingredient is the collateral-secured loan in the decentralized
matching market, in which the borrowers must put up their own land as collateral.
They borrow debt for intertemporal smoothing of the consumption stream and also
for factor payment in production. In the crisis state, the land price is low and the
debt for factor payment, i.e., liquidity, dries up. Facing a liquidity shortage, all sellers
choose not to participate in the matching market and the market is shut down due
to the search externality. This market disruption lowers the aggregate productivity,
while the low productivity justiﬁes the low asset price in turn.
We may be able to derive a policy implication that collective debt reduction by
government intervention may solve the coordination failure and bring the economy
out of the crisis equilibrium.
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 1 Introduction
In recent ﬁnancial crises, asset-price collapses caused tightening of credit in the economy
where collateral-secured loans were widespread. Examples are Japan’s lost decade in the
1990s, the Asian currency crisis in 1997–1998, and the global ﬁnancial crisis in 2008.
Real estate, such as commercial properties and/or housing assets, is used as collateral
for loans all over the world, and once the prices of collateral assets collapse, credit and
liquidity are severely tightened.
Macroeconomic theorists so far have proposed two diﬀerent kinds of models for col-
lateral lending. In one strand of models collateral lending smooths consumption and
investment intertemporally (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997; Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
1999; Iacoviello 2005). In the other models collateral lending is modeled as an intratem-
poral debt that is used as an instrument for factor payment for production (Carlstrom
and Fuerst 1997, 1998; Jermann and Quadrini 2006; Mendoza 2006; Kobayashi, Naka-
jima and Inaba 2007; Kobayashi and Nutahara 2007). We call the instrument for factor
payment liquidity in this paper. Collateral lending works either as an intertemporal
smoother of consumption and investment or as an intratemporal liquidity in the respec-
tive strands of existing models.
In this paper, we propose a model in which collateral lending plays both roles of an
intertemporal smoother and of intratemporal liquidity. We show that the interaction
between the two roles of collateral lending causes multiple steady-state equilibria to
exist. There are two steady states, one of which is a bad equilibrium where the asset
price collapses and a decentralized matching market is disrupted due to a shortage of
liquidity. In the bad equilibrium, the land price is low and the intratemporal debt, i.e.,
liquidity, dries up because of the shortage of collateral. Consequently, the decentralized
matching market is disrupted: Since patient agents choose whether to participate in the
matching market, when the land price is low all patient agents choose not to participate
and the market is shut down. The participation choice by patient agents has an external
eﬀect on impatient agents through search probability, which makes the bad equilibrium
a stable equilibrium. The market disruption lowers the aggregate productivity, while
2the low productivity justiﬁes the low asset price in turn. We may be able to derive
an implication for “macroprudential policy” (Borio 2003, Bernanke 2008) or ﬁnancial
crisis management: Collective debt reduction by impatient agents due to government
intervention may solve the coordination failure and bring the economy out of the crisis
equilibrium.
Related literature: This paper shows that an asset-price collapse can cause a po-
tentially persistent, maybe decade-long, recession due to a liquidity shortage. The mech-
anism proposed in this paper may be a possible explanation for persistent productivity
declines observed in various episodes of “great depressions.” See Kehoe and Prescott
(2002, 2007) and references therein for a neoclassical account for the great depressions in
the 20th century: In most of the episodes, productivity declines were the primal factor
that caused the depressions, while the root causes of productivity declines are left un-
explained in these research ﬁndings (see also Ohanian 2001). The mechanism of market
disruption in our model, that is, the disruption of transactions in the matching market, is
close to the disruption of the chains of production (or the division of labor among ﬁrms)
in Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and Kobayashi (2004, 2006). One contribution of this
paper is the model’s ability to analyze the relationship between the asset price and the
market disruption explicitly through adoption of the search-theoretic framework of Lagos
and Wright (2005). Although the Lagos-Wright framework is intended to contribute to
monetary theory (see Rocheteau and Wright 2005, and Lagos and Rocheteau 2005, for
application of this framework in the monetary theory literature), we use it to construct
essentially a “real” model in the spirit of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998).
Two-agent example: Before presenting a formal model, we show a simple two-
agent example. Suppose that there exist continua of buyers and sellers with measure 1,
respectively. The economy continues two periods: t = 0,1. The buyer’s utility comes
from his consumption at both t = 0 and t = 1, while the seller’s utility comes from his
consumption at t = 1 only. We assume that the buyer’s utility is b0 + βb1, where bi is
his consumption at t = i and that the seller’s utility is s1, which equals his consumption
3at t = 1. We assume that 1/2 < β < 1. Suppose that each buyer is endowed with K
units of consumption goods at t = 0 and nothing at t = 1. The consumption goods can
be consumed by both sellers and buyers. Each seller is endowed with nothing at t = 0
and 1 unit of intermediate goods at t = 1, which can be transformed into 2Q units of
consumption goods only by a buyer, where Q < K. The intermediate goods cannot be
consumed by anyone. At t = 1, a decentralized matching market opens and all buyers
participate in the market, while each seller must pay a cost (i.e., disutility) of κ to enter
the market if he decides to participate. In the matching market, buyers and sellers search
for their trading partners and matching of a seller and a buyer is made with matching
function Λ(1,µ), where 1 is the measure of buyers and µ is the measure of sellers who
participate in the matching market. We assume Λ(1,1) = 1 and Λ(1,0) = 0, that is,
the matching occurs with probability 1 if all sellers participate and the matching never
occurs if no sellers participate. If the match is made, the seller gives the intermediate
good in exchange for the consumption good. We assume for simplicity that an unspeciﬁed
market institution determines that the price of the intermediate good is Q, that is, the
seller gives one unit of the intermediate good in exchange for Q units of consumption
goods. At t = 0, each buyer chooses consumption, b0. If K − b0 ≥ Q, he can buy the
intermediate good and consume b1 = K − b0 + Q at t = 1. If K − b0 < Q, he cannot
buy the intermediate good and consume b1 = K − b0 at t = 1. There are two equilibria
for this example. In one equilibrium, no sellers participate in the matching market and
the buyers consume K, all their endowment, at t = 0 since b1 is discounted. Therefore,
b0 = K and b1 = 0. The sellers’ consumption at t = 1 is zero: s1 = 0. In another
equilibrium, all sellers participate and get the utility s1 − κ, where s1 = Q. The buyers
consume b0 = K − Q at t = 0 and b1 = 2Q at t = 1. The welfare is obviously higher
in the latter equilibrium than the former. The former corresponds to the ﬁnancial crisis
and the latter corresponds to the normal state in our formal model in the next section.
In the next section, we present the model and show our basic results including policy
implication for ﬁnancial crisis management. In Section 3, we consider a generalized model
4where multiple matching markets open sequentially in the daytime. Section 4 concludes.
In Appendix, we brieﬂy describe a monetary version of our model.
2 Model
The model is a variant of the search-theoretic model developed by Lagos and Wright
(2005), in which we introduce collateral lending as a payment instrument just like Fer-
raris and Watanabe (2008). Unlike Ferraris and Watanabe’s model, in which lenders
give cash to the borrowers and the total amount of cash is exogenously given by the
government, banks in our model can costlessly create the payment instruments, which
may be interpreted as bank notes or promissory notes.
2.1 Setup
The model is a closed economy ` a la Lagos and Wright (2005), in which there are continua
of patient agents and impatient agents, who live forever. The measures of patient and
impatient agents are M and 1 respectively, while M is suﬃciently large:
M ≫ 1. (1)
There is also a unit mass of banks that can create payment instruments (i.e., bank
notes) costlessly and lend them to agents as collateral-secured loans. Time is discrete
and continues from 0 to inﬁnity: t = 0,1,··· ,∞. The numeraire is the consumption
good. For each date t, the market is open twice: the day market and the night market.
Agents can consume the consumption good only in the night market. The consumption
goods are not storable, that is, the consumption goods produced in the day market or
the night market of date t must be consumed in the date-t night market, otherwise they
perish before date t+1 begins. The day market is a decentralized search market in which
patient agents and impatient agents trade intermediate goods when they meet. A trade
in the day market is quid pro quo and no trade credit is available. The night market is
a centralized Walrasian market in which patient and impatient agents and banks trade
consumption goods, land, bonds issued by impatient agents, and bank notes.
5In the day market, when a patient agent and an impatient agent meet each other,
the patient agent produces the intermediate good and sells it to the impatient agent
at a competitive market price. The impatient agent pays for the intermediate good by
giving the bank notes that she borrowed from a bank in the previous night market.
Patient agents need to pay a ﬁxed cost for participating in the day market, and they
choose whether they participate in the day market or not at the beginning of each
period t. In the night market, impatient agents issue intertemporal bonds and patient
agents buy the bonds in exchange for the consumption good. Impatient agents also
borrow bank notes from banks and can hold productive assets, i.e., land. For simplicity
we assume that patient agents cannot hold land. Impatient agents have incomplete
commitment technology. Therefore, they cannot precommit to redemption of their bonds
nor repayment of their bank loans. However, the impatient agents can use land as
collateral for their bonds and bank loans. Banks have complete commitment technology:
They can commit themselves to pay one unit of consumption good in the night market
in exchange for one unit of bank note that they issued in the previous night market.
Therefore, bank notes are circulated as a payment instrument in the day market.
2.2 Optimization problem for patient agents
The state variable for a patient agent who enters the day market is the amount of bonds
that she hold from the previous period. She holds bonds issued by impatient agents as
her assets. When she enters the night market the bonds and the revenue she earned
in the day market are the state variables. We denote the value function for a patient
agent when she enters the day market by V p(dt−1) and that for the night market by
Wp(nt,dt−1), where dt−1 is bond holding and nt is the revenue (i.e., bank notes) she gets
in the day market. Both dt−1 and nt are measured in the unit of the date-t consumption
good, that is, one unit of bond or bank note issued in the date-(t − 1) night market is a
claim to one unit of date-t consumption good.
At the beginning of the day market, a patient agent chooses whether she participate
in the day market by paying ﬁxed cost κ for market participation. The Bellman equation

















where qt is the quantity of the intermediate good produced; γ(qt) is the cost for produc-
tion, which satisﬁes γ′(q) > 0, γ′′(q) > 0, and γ(0) = 0; pt is the competitive price of the
intermediate good; α(µt) is the matching probability for a patient agent with which she
meets an impatient agent in the day market, where µt (0 ≤ µt ≤ M) is the measure of
the patient agents who participate in the day market. The expected gain for a patient
agent from participating in the day market, π, is
π ≡ −κ + α(µt)max
qt
{−γ(qt) + Wp(ptqt,dt−1) − Wp(0,dt−1)}. (4)
Given the aggregate measure of participating patient agents, µt, a patient agent decides
to participate if π > 0; not to participate if π < 0; and is indiﬀerent if π = 0. The
Bellman equation for the night market is
Wp(nt,dt−1) = max
ct;ht;dt
ct − ht + βV p(dt), (5)
subject to ct ≤ dt−1 −
dt
1 + rt
+ nt + ht, (6)
where ct is the consumption, ht is the labor supply, rt is the real interest rate, and β
(0 < β < 1) is the intertemporal discount factor. To simplify the analysis, we make
the assumption that patient agents directly gain ct units of utility from consuming ct,
which simpliﬁes the form of collateral constraint in the problem of impatient agents. As
is standard in the Lagos-Wright framework, we assume that the labor input in the night
market gives linear disutility and is transformed into the consumption good linearly. As
shown below, this convention simpliﬁes the analysis greatly by making all agents choose
7the same value of dt, and degenerating the heterogeneity among agents with respect to







+ nt + βV p(dt). (7)







The envelope conditions for (7) are
Wp
n(nt,dt−1) = 1, (9)
W
p
d(nt,dt−1) = 1. (10)





Therefore, the Bellman equation for the day market can be rewritten as
V p(dt−1) = max{−κ + α(µt)max
qt
[−γ(qt) + ptqt], 0} + dt−1 + W
p
0. (11)
Since the price of the intermediate good is determined competitively,1 FOC for qt is
pt = γ′(qt). (12)
The envelope condition, i.e., V
p
d (dt−1) = 1, and (8) imply that
β(1 + rt) = 1. (13)
The measure of the patient agents who participate in the day market, µt, is determined
endogenously by participation decisions of individual agents. The gain from participation
π(µt) can be rewritten as
π(µt) = −κ + α(µt){−γ(qt) + ptqt}. (14)
1Although we assume for simplicity price-taking behavior of all agents in the matching market, we
can easily modify our model such that the trading scheme in the day market is a bilateral bargaining or
competitive search, following Rocheteau and Wright (2005).
8There exist multiple equilibria corresponding to diﬀerent values of µt: µt = 0 can be
an equilibrium since π(0) = −κ < 0 and an impatient agent chooses not to participate
when π < 0; and the solution to π(µt) = 0 can be an equilibrium, too. Therefore, µt is
determined by the following equation in equilibrium:
µt[α(µt){ptqt − γ(qt)} − κ] = 0. (15)
2.3 Optimization problem for impatient agents
The state variables for an impatient agent who enters the decentralized day market are
the amount of bonds she issued in the previous night market (bt−1); the amount of bank
loans she borrowed in the previous night market (lt−1); and the land she purchased in the
previous night market (kt−1). The impatient agent borrows lt−1 from a bank in the form
of bank notes, that is, she is given lt−1 units of bank notes when she borrows from the
bank in the previous night market. Note that bt−1 and lt−1 are measured in the units of
date-t consumption good. The state variables when she enters the current night market
are bt−1, lt−1, kt−1, the remaining bank notes (n′
t), and the output she produced in the
day market (yt). In the date-t night market, the impatient agent must repay Rt−1lt−1
units of the date-t consumption good to the banks, where Rt−1 is the gross rate of return





+ {1 − α(µt)µt}W(0,lt−1,lt−1,bt−1,kt−1), (16)
subject to n′
t = lt−1 − ptqt (17)
n′




where V ( · ) is the value function for an impatient agent who enters the day market, W( · )
is that for those who enters the night market, and α(µt)µt is the matching probability
of an impatient agent, meeting a patient agent in the day market.2
2We assume a standard constant-returns-to-scale matching function, Λ(µ
p,µ
i), for the day market,
where µ
p and µ
i are the measures of patient and impatient agents who participate in the day market. The








t + β′V (lt,bt,kt), (20)
subject to c′
t + atkt + bt−1 + Rt−1lt−1
≤ yt + h′





bt + Rtlt ≤ at+1kt, (22)
lt ≥ 0, (23)
where at the beginning of the night market one unit of land generates the dividend ωt,
which is exogenously given by nature; at is the date-t land price; c′
t is the consumption;
U(c) is the utility from the consumption, where U′(c) > 0, U′′(c) < 0, and U′(0) = +∞;
h′
t is the labor supply; and β′ is the intertemporal discount factor that satisﬁes
0 < β′ < β < 1. (24)








1+rt on the right-hand side (RHS)
and that on the left-hand side (LHS) cancel out. The interpretation is as follows: the
impatient agent borrows lt
1+rt units of date-t consumption goods from the bank, which
appears on the RHS, while she immediately purchases lt units of the bank note, which is
just paper but can be used as a means of payment in the date-(t + 1) day market, from
the bank at price 1/(1+rt); therefore, another lt
1+rt appears on the LHS. We also assume
the Lagos-Wright convention that h′
t gives linear disutility and is transformed into the
consumption good linearly. Because the impatient agent cannot precommit to repay bt
to the creditor (i.e., a patient agent) nor to repay Rtlt to the bank in the date-(t + 1)
night market, she must put up her land as collateral for bt + Rtlt when she borrows bt
and lt in the date-t night market. When the impatient agent repudiates her debt, the
creditors seize the collateral and sell it oﬀ in the date-(t+1) night market. Since there is














p = µ and µ
i = 1 in our model, the matching probability for
a patient agent is α(µ) and that for an impatient agent is α(µ)µ, where α(µ) ´ Λ(1,1/µ).
10no further penalty for repudiation, the debtor surely diverts and defaults on the excess
amount of debt that exceeds the value of collateral. Therefore, there is no reason for the















subject to (22) and (23).
The FOCs are
U′(c′
t) = 1, (25)
1
1 + rt
− ξt + β′Vb(lt,bt,kt) = 0, (26)
β′Vk(lt,bt,kt) = at − ξtat+1, (27)
β′Vl(lt,bt,kt) + ηt − Rtξt = 0, (28)
where ξt and ηt are the Lagrange multipliers for (22) and (23), respectively. The envelope
conditions are
Wy(t − 1) = 1, Wl(t − 1) = −Rt−1, Wn′(t − 1) = 1,
Wb(t − 1) = −1, Wk(t − 1) = ωt + at,
where Wz(t − 1) is the derivative of W(yt,n′
t,lt−1,bt−1,kt−1) with respect to z (=
yt,n′
t,lt−1,bt−1, or kt−1). These conditions imply that W(yt,n′
t,lt−1,bt−1,kt−1) = yt −
3Although we do not consider stochastic shocks to the asset prices in this paper, our model can be
easily generalized to a stochastic model. In such a case, the collateral constraint, (22), is rewritten as
bt +Rtlt · Et[at+1]kt, where Et[ ¢ ] is the mathematical expectations based on the information available
at date t. This is the risk neutrality of the patient agent that leads her to evaluate the value of collateral
as the mathematical expectation of the value of the asset in the next period. If the utility function of
the patient agents is not linear, the collateral constraint in the stochastic model is no longer as simple
as the one above.
11Rt−1lt−1 + n′
t − bt−1 + (ωt + at)kt−1 + W0, where W0 ≡ W(0,0,0,0,0). The Bellman





t − ptqt} + (1 − Rt−1)lt−1 − bt−1
+ (ωt + at)kt−1 + W0, (29)








where xt is the Lagrange multiplier for (30). The envelope conditions are
Vl(lt−1,bt−1,kt−1) = α(µt)µtxt, (32)
Vb(lt−1,bt−1,kt−1) = −1, (33)
Vk(lt−1,bt−1,kt−1) = ωt + α(µt)µtθAkµ−1
t−1q1−µ
t + at. (34)
Note that the collateral constraint (30) becomes binding with probability α(µt)µt if it
binds at all, since it becomes relevant only when the impatient agent successfully matches
with a patient agent. Conditions (26)–(28) and (32)–(34) imply the following system of
equations that determines the dynamics of the models:
β′α(µt+1)µt+1xt+1 + ηt = Rtξt, (35)
1 = (1 + rt){ξt + β′}, (36)








A bank lends lt units of bank notes to an impatient agent in the date-t night market.
The bank has the commitment technology so that the bank can give one unit of the
consumption good in exchange for one unit of the bank note in the date-(t + 1) night
market. The borrower repays Rtlt in the form of the consumption good to the bank in
the date-(t + 1) night market, where Rt is determined competitively. If the borrower
12repudiates her debt, the bank can seize collateral from the borrower but cannot impose
any further penality on the borrower. The bank’s proﬁt in units of the date-(t + 1)
consumption good is Rtlt−lt. In the date-t night market, the bank chooses lt to maximize
Rtlt − lt, where there is no restriction on the supply of lt. Therefore, in equilibrium,
Rt = 1. (38)
This result parallels that for the intraperiod debt in Carlstrom and Fuerst’s (1998) model.
Note that Rt = 1 is guaranteed by the fact that the bank can create costlessly an
unlimited amount of bank notes. If the bank needs to give cash to the borrower and the
total supply of cash is ﬁxed exogenously, Rt may exceed 1 when the total amount of cash
is small. See Ferraris and Watanabe (2008) for this case.
2.5 Equilibrium
The total supply of land is ﬁxed in this economy:
kt = K. (39)
The bond market clears:
∀t, Mdt = bt. (40)
The equilibrium of this economy is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 A competitive equilibrium consists of prices, {pt,Rt,rt,at}, and quantities,
{ct,c′
t,ht,h′
t,qt,kt,dt,bt,lt,µt}, that satisfy that (i) given the prices, the quantities satisfy
(12) and (15), which are the optimality conditions for patient agents; (ii) given the prices
and {µt}, quantities solve impatient agents’ optimization problems, (20) and (29), and
banks’ optimization problem; and (iii) equilibrium conditions, (39) and (40), are satisﬁed.
The equilibrium path of this economy is described by the prices, {pt,Rt,rt,at,xt,ξt,ηt},
and the quantities, {c′
t,qt,kt,bt,dt,lt,µt}, where they are the solution to the following
system of equations: (12), (13), (15), (22), (25), (30), (31), (35), (36), (37), (38), (39),
13(40), and
ηtptqt = 0. (41)
Equations (13) and (36) imply that 1 + rt = 1/β and ξt = β − β′. We can show the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, either (qt,µt) = (qh,µh) or (qt,µt) = (0,0), where qh =
q(µh) and µh is the solution to Π(µ) = κ; where Π(µ) ≡ α(µ){γ′(q(µ))q(µ) − γ(q(µ))}








Proof: In equilibrium either ηt = 0 or ηt > 0. In the case where ηt > 0, the nonnegativity
condition (23) is binding. Since lt = ptqt = 0, qt = 0 in equilibrium. Equation (15)
implies that since the gain from participating in the day market is zero for a patient
agent, all patient agents decide not to participate and µt = 0 in this case. Therefore,
in equilibrium where ηt = 0, (qt,µt) = (0,0). In the case where ηt = 0, it must be the
case that µt ̸= 0, since otherwise (35) implies that ξt = 0, which contradicts the fact
that ξt = β − β′ > 0. Therefore, µt > 0 when ηt = 0. With µt > 0, (35) implies that
xt = (β − β′)/{α(µt)µt}. Therefore, (12), (31), and (39) imply that qt satisﬁes (42).
Note that (42) determines qt as an increasing function of µt, that is, qt = q(µt), since
the left-hand side of (42) is monotonically increasing in qt and the right-hand side is
monotonically increasing in µt. Since µt > 0 and qt = q(µt) in the case where ηt = 0,
(15) implies that µt is determined by Π(µt) = κ. Since (42) implies that q(0) = 0,
Π(0) = 0. Since the matching probability for a patient agent, α(µ), converges to zero as
µ → ∞, it must be the case that lim¹→∞ Π(µ) = 0. Since α(µ) is decreasing in µ and
γ′(q(µ))q(µ)−γ(q(µ)) is increasing in µ, Π(µ) has only one peak as shown in Figure 1 if
functional forms for α( · ) and γ( · ) are given appropriately.4
Figure 1
4For example we can set α(µ) = minf1,µ
−δg and γ(q) = q
ϵ, where 0 < δ < 1 < ϵ.
14We assume that κ is suﬃciently small and functional forms for α( · ) and γ( · ) are
given appropriately such that there exists unique µ such that Π(µ) is increasing in µ for
0 ≤ µ ≤ µ and decreasing for µ ≥ µ. And we assume that κ is suﬃciently small such
that Π(µ) = κ has exactly two solutions, µl and µh, where 0 < µl < µh < M. Note
that we assumed that the total measure of patient agents, M, is suﬃciently large. Π(µ)
is increasing in the neighborhood of µl and decreasing in the neighborhood of µh. The
equilibrium with µ = µl is unstable because a slight deviation from µl is ampliﬁed by
participation decisions of individual agents. The equilibrium with µh is stable, since a
deviation from µh is corrected by participation decisions by individual agents. So we
can focus on the solution µt = µh. We have shown that for appropriate parameters and
functional forms, (qt,µt) = (qh,µh) in equilibrium where ηt = 0. Q.E.D.
Since there is no technological innovation nor capital accumulation in this model,
there are no time-varying state variables relevant to the aggregate dynamics of the econ-
omy. So any sequence of {qt,µt}∞
t=0 that satisﬁes ∀t,(qt,µt) ∈ {(qh,µh),(0,0)}, can be
an equilibrium path: Given any such sequence of {qt,µt}∞
t=0, the sequence of {at,bt}∞
t=0
is determined by (37) and




where ph = γ′(qh). Therefore, an equilibrium path of this model is a sunspot equilibrium
in the sense that any path that satisﬁes Proposition 1 can be the equilibrium outcome
solely depending on the agents’ expectations.
2.6 Steady States
In what follows in this paper we focus on the steady-state equilibria. Steady-state values




{ω + α(µ)µθAKµ−1q1−µ}, (44)
b + pq ≤ aK, (45)
(46)
15The welfare of patient and impatient agents is measured by the values of their value
functions at the beginning of the daytime in the steady state:






1 − β′{AKµq1−µ − pq} +
ωK
1 − β′ −
1 − β
1 − β′b, (48)
where V p and V are the welfare of patient and impatient agents, respectively. If we
deﬁne the total welfare of the economy in the steady state, E, as the sum of the patient
and impatient agents’ welfare, it can be written as
E ≡ MV p + V =
α(µ)µ
1 − β′{AKµq1−µ − pq} +
ωK
1 − β′ +
β − β′
1 − β′ b. (49)
There exist two types of steady state in our model: one with (q,µ) = (qh,µh) and the
other with (q,µ) = (0,0).
2.6.1 Normal state
We call steady state with (q,µ) = (qh,µh) the “normal state.” The asset price and the






bn = anK − phqh, (51)
where qh = q(µh) and ph = γ′(qh). In the equilibrium where µ is positive, collateral
is used to issue intertemporal bonds for consumption smoothing and also it is used to
borrow bank notes for factor payment in the decentralized day market. The day market
in which agents form chains of productions is operative in the equilibrium where µ > 0,
while it is shut down in the equilibrium we describe in the following section.
2.6.2 Crisis state
We call the steady state with (q,µ) = (0,0) the “crisis state,” because the decentralized






bc = acK. (53)
Obviously from (50) and (52), the asset price is lower in the crisis state than in the











It is shown as follows that the total welfare in the normal state, En, is higher than that
in the crisis state, Ec. Deﬁne ∆ ≡ (1 − β′)(En − Ec). Then (49) implies
∆ = α(µh)µh{AKµq1−µ









Since (42) implies γ′(q)q = (1 − θ)β′α(µ)µAKµq1−µ/{β′α(µ)µ + β − β′} and {α(µ)µ +








h > 0. (56)
Therefore, the total welfare, E, is higher in the normal state than in the crisis state.
2.7 Coordination failure in the crisis state and policy implications
In the date-t night market, impatient agents choose lt, given µt+1; and at the begin-
ning of date-(t + 1), the measure of participating patient agents, µt+1, is determined by
participation choices of individual patient agents, which are made taking µt+1 and lt as
given.
In the crisis state, patient agents collectively set µt+1 = 0 and impatient agents choose
lt = 0 for all t. Given that lt = 0, a patient agent has no incentive to participate in the
date-(t + 1) day market: If she participates, she can meet with an impatient agent with
probability 1 because µt+1 = 0. (Note that all impatient agents participate in the day
17market.) But the impatient agent has no payment instrument, and therefore the patient
agent can get nothing in the day market, while she must pay κ when she enters the day
market. Thus the expected gain from participation is negative for a patient agent.
Given that µt+1 = 0, an impatient agent has no incentive to borrow from a bank in
the date-t night market and bring bank notes into the date-(t+1) day market: Since she
can meet with a patient agent in the day market with zero probability, the bank notes
are useless. Meanwhile, she wants to maximize the amount of bonds that she issues, bt,
since the market rate, rt = β−1 −1 is cheaper than her subjective rate of time discount,
i.e., (β′)−1 − 1. Therefore, all impatient agents set bt at its maximum possible value,
at+1K, and they set lt = 0.
Note that the coordination failure that causes the crisis equilibrium to exist occurs
due to the existence of both the intertemporal consumption loan, bt, and the loan for
intratemporal payment, lt. Both debts are necessary to make multiple equilibria. For
example, if we did not introduce consumption loan, bt, in our model, the crisis state
would be eliminated and the normal state would become the only steady-state equilib-
rium because lt is always positive under the collateral constraint, lt ≤ at+1kt. The novel
feature of our model, that is, the use of the collateral-secured loan as both intertem-
poral consumption loan and intratemporal liquidity, enables the multiple steady-state
equilibria to exist.
Policy implications: As we saw above, there is no incentive for impatient agents
to reduce their bonds individually in the crisis state. Therefore, the eﬀectiveness of
a government intervention may be what is necessary to coordinate the expectations
and eliminate the crisis equilibrium. For example, if the government intervenes and
imposes the restriction that all impatient agents must set their intertemporal liabilities,
bt, such that bt ≤ at+1kt − phqh, then the crisis state is eliminated and the economy can
immediately jump to the normal state. The government-coordinated debt restriction
may be interpreted as a simpliﬁed model of the government policies during the episodes
of ﬁnancial crises, such as the $ 700 billion TARP (Troubled Assets Relief Program)
18scheme initiated by the Treasury in 2008, in which the US government will buy and
dispose of the nonperforming assets and will ultimately bail out debt-ridden households
and ﬁrms. In past episodes of ﬁnancial crises all over the world, the governments of the
crisis-aﬀected countries undertook various crisis-management policies to urge ﬁnancial
institutions to dispose of nonperforming assets and to reduce the debt burdens in the
private sector. In light of our model, we can consider that the essence of these crisis-
management policies may be to restrict bt in order to restore the supply of liquidity,
lt.
Another policy implication would be that if the binding collateral constraint for
borrowers is crucial in a ﬁnancial crisis, policies targeted at lenders may not be eﬀective
enough to attain economic recovery. For example, rehabilitation of the banking sector by
capital injections and liquidity provision to banks by the central bank may not eﬀectively
resolve market disruptions due to a ﬁnancial crisis unless the debt reduction of borrowers
is properly addressed.
3 Generalization – Chains of production
There may be several directions for generalization of this model. One of the most intrigu-
ing generalizations would be to incorporate ﬁat money into this model in a meaningful
way, while it turns out to be impossible in our patient-and-impatient-agents framework.
Because of the diﬀerence in time discount factors, impatient agents never hold nom-
inal money in a steady-state equilibrium. It is also easily shown that even when an
interest-bearing money, i.e., bank deposits, is introduced, the impatient agents do not
hold deposit money in a steady state (See Appendix).
In this section, we consider a generalization that makes our stylized model a little
closer to the reality of chains of production and business cycles by introducing multiple
matching markets which open distinct subperiods in the daytime. We can assume that
impatient agents go through the matching markets sequentially during the daytime, while
in each market they produce the consumption good using land and the intermediate
good produced by patient agents. We assume a simple structure of chains of production
19and an impatient agent, who could not produce in a matching market, cannot enter
the subsequent matching markets and must go to the night market directly; and only
an impatient agent who successfuly produces in a matching market can enter the next
matching market. In equilibrium, several matching markets may be operative, while the
other matching markets are shutdown. Although we have only two steady states in the
basic model, there arise naturally more than two steady-state equilibria in the generalized
model, each of which is distinguished by the number of open matching markets or,
equivalently, by the level of land prices. In a steady state with a higher land price,
more matching markets are operative. The steady states in the generalized model may
be interpreted as representing various stages in the business cycle, such as a boom, a
shallow recession, a deep recession, etc. Thus the generalized model may be potentially
useful to analyze both ordinary business cycles and extraordinary ﬁnancial crises in a
uniﬁed framework.
The generalized model shows a new theoretical possibility of expectations-driven
business cycles: Changes in asset prices may cause changes in the current and future
productivity through changes in the expectations of the number of operative matching
markets, while the productivity changes justify the ﬂuctuations in the asset prices. In
short, the generalized model shows that the expectations of the operative matching mar-
kets may drive the business cycles, while the expectations are justiﬁed by the induced
productivity changes.5 The features of our model are exactly the same as sunspot equi-
librium models in that the number of operative matching markets, the asset price, and
the aggregate productivity are endogenously selected from candidates of steady states,
and there is no selection mechanism that is based on economic fundamentals.
5This type of the expectations-driven business cycle may be interesting because in the existing models
of the expectations-driven business cycles pioneered by Beaudry and Portier (2004), the expectations on
future productivity is exogenously provided, while in our model the expectations change endogenously.
For examples of the existing models of the expectations-driven business cycles, see Christiano, Ilut, Motto
and Rostagno (2007), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008), and Kobayashi, Nakajima, and Inaba (2007).
203.1 Setup
The model is the same as the basic model described in the previous section except that
there are N subperiods in the daytime, where N ≥ 2, and a distinct matching market
opens in each subperiod. We call the matching market in the i-th subperiod the D-i
market, where i = 1,2,··· ,N.
3.2 Optimization of impatient agents
An impatient agent enters the D-1 market in the ﬁrst subperiod of the daytime of date
t, bringing lt−1 units of bank notes that are borrowed from a bank, bt−1 units of debt
obligations, and kt−1 units of land from the date-(t − 1) night market. The impatient
agent searches for a patient agent, and if she successfully meets a patient agent she buys
the intermediate good from the patient agent and produces the consumption good; and
only if she successfully produces in the D-1 market does she enter the D-2 market in
the second subperiod, bringing the output of the D-1 market and the remaining bank
notes. If she does not meet a patient agent in D-1 market, she cannot participate in any
subsequent markets in the daytime and must go directly to the night market. This process
is repeated N times, going from D-1 to D-N markets. In the D-i market, an impatient




t , where µ
(i)
t is the relative measure
of patient agents who participate in the D-i market, that is, the measure of participating
patient agents divided by the measure of impatient agents who participate in the D-i
market.6 We denote variables in the D-i market with the superscript (i).
The Bellman equation for the D-i market (1 ≤ i ≤ N) is as follows. The state
variables in the value function are y
(i−1)
t , the consumption good that the agent carries at
the beginning of the D-i market; n
(i−1)
t , the remaining bank notes that the agent carries
at the beginning of the D-i market; lt−1, the bank loan that the agent borrowed in the
6Using the relative measure, µ
(i)
























































t }1−µ + y
(i−1)
t , (60)
where V (i)( · ) is the value function for an impatient agent entering the D-i market;
V (N+1)( · ) ≡ W( · ); y
(0)
t = 0; and n
(0)
t = lt−1. Note that the production technology
given in (60) guarantees that the production in the D-i market is independent from
the output in the D-j market for i ̸= j. Note also that the assumption of chains of
production that only those who successfully produce in the D-i market can enter the
D-(i + 1) market greatly simpliﬁes the analysis by avoiding the curse of dimensionality.
This is because this assumption guarantees that all impatient agents who participate
in a matching market have identical trading history and have identical values of state
variables.
Since the problem for an impatient agent in the night market is identical to the basic













t + atkt + bt−1
≤ yt + h′





bt + Rtlt ≤ at+1kt, (63)
lt ≥ 0, (64)
n
(0)
t+1 ≤ lt. (65)
22The same arguments as those in the previous section imply that the value function for
the night market can be written as
W(yt,nt,lt−1,bt−1,kt−1) = yt + nt − Rt−1lt−1 − bt−1 + (ωt + at)kt−1 + W0. (66)






i=1: First, V (N)( · ) is solved using (66); and V (i)( · ) is solved backwardly










































t , for i = 1,2,··· ,N, (68)

































t are the Lagrange multipliers for (68) and (69), respectively, and the
FOCs for (61) and the envelope conditions for (67) imply that x
(0)
t = β−β′ and η
(0)
t = 0.
3.3 Optimization of the patient agent
We assume that at the beginning of each date a patient agent chooses whether she
participates in a decentralized matching market in the daytime. A patient agent can
participate in at most one market among D-1, ···, D-N markets. Thus the optimization
problem for a patient agent is identical to the basic model. Therefore, µ
(i)
t , the relative














t = 0. (72)
If µ
(i)
t > 0, q
(i)
t is determined by the FOC:
γ′(q
(i)




We can deﬁne a competitive equilibrium of the N-market model as follows.













i=1}, that satisfy that (i) given the prices,
the quantities satisfy (72) and (73), which are the optimality conditions for patient agents;
(ii) given the prices and {µ
(i)
t }N
i=1, the quantities solve impatient agents’ optimization
problems, (67) and (61), and banks’ optimization problem; and (iii) equilibrium condi-
tions, (39) and (40), are satisﬁed.
The equilibrium values of variables in the D-i market are determined by solving (70), (71),
(72) and (73) forwardly, given x
(0)
t = β−β′ and η
(0)
t = 0, where η
(i)
t = 0 if the D-i market
is operative. There exist multiple steady-state equilibria. The D-i market is either open
or shutdown for i = 1,2,··· ,N in a steady-state equilibrium. Since the assumption of
chains of production guarantees that if µ
(i)
t = 0 then µ
(j)
t = 0 for all j ≥ i + 1, there
exist at most N + 1 steady-state equilibria: Each equilibrium is distinguished by the
number of the matching markets that are not shutdown. We can deﬁne I-equilibrium
(I = 0,1,··· ,N) as a steady-state equilibrium where the ﬁrst I matching markets are
operative, that is, µ(i) > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ I and µ(i) = 0 for I+1 ≤ i ≤ N. In I-equilibrium,
the equilibrium variables in the D-i market are determined by the following system of




1 + x(i) , (74)
x(i−1) = β′α(µ(i))µ(i)x(i), (75)
α(µ(i)){p(i)q(i) − γ(q(i))} − κ = 0, (76)
γ′(q(i)) = p(i), (77)
for i = 1,2,··· ,I; and q(i) = µ(i) = 0 for i = I + 1,··· ,N.
The values of {p(i),q(i),µ(i),x(i)}N
i=1 are determined by solving the system of equations
(74)–(77) forwardly from i = 1 to i = N, given x(0) = β−β′. Note that if the D-i market
24is open in both I-equilibrium and I′-equilibrium, the values of variables in the D-i market
are identical in I- and I′-equilibria for I ̸= I′.7














a(I) is increasing in I, that is, the asset price is higher in the equilibrium where more
matching markets are operative. The amount of bonds in I-equilibrium is determined
by




The welfare of an agent can be deﬁned as the value of her value function at the beginning
of the daytime in the steady state. Thus the welfare of a patient agent in I-equilibrium,
V p(I), and that of an impatient agent, V (1)(I), are


























We can deﬁne the total welfare of the economy in I-equilibrium by E(I) ≡ MV p(I) +























7Note also that for a certain range of parameter values there may exist J(· N) such that the above




(i)g for i = J. In this case, D-J,
D-(J + 1), ¢¢¢, D-N markets are always shutdown in any equilibrium. In this case, there exist only J
steady-state equilibria: 0-, 1-, ¢¢¢, (J ¡ 1)-equilibria.
25It is shown, as follows, that E(I) is increasing in I, that is, the welfare of the economy
increases as the number of operative matching markets increases. Deﬁne ∆(I) ≡ (1 −














i=1 α(µ(i))µ(i). Since x(I) = (β − β′)/[(β′)IΓ(I)] and {Γ(I) + β −







θΓ(I)A(I)Kµ{q(I)}1−µ > 0, (84)
which implies that E(I) > E(I − 1) for all I ≥ 1.
Policy implications: Multiple steady-state equilibria arise in this generalized model
due to the same coordination failure that we discussed in the previous section. This
model is essentially a sunspot equilibrium model and the equilibrium selection depends
on the macroeconomic expectations. Government policy or regulation that restricts the
amount of debt issued by impatient agents may improve the coordination failure and
may change the equilibrium. For example, if the government imposes the restriction
that bt ≤ at+1kt −
∑J
i=1 p(i)q(i), then the candidates of the steady-state equilibrium that
can be realized become restricted to J-, (J + 1)-, ···, N-equilibria. In other words, the
steady states from 0-equilibrium to (J − 1)-equilibrium are eliminated from the candi-
dates of realizable steady-state equilibrium. Therefore, this model implies that monetary
policy and/or ﬁnancial regulations that restrict the aggregate level of debt may raise the
aggregate productivity and asset prices through increasing liquidity, which enhances eco-
nomic transactions in decentralized matching markets. This policy implication may be
consistent with the historical episodes of ﬁnancial crises. Japan and Sweden, for example,
experienced collapses of land prices and the emergence of nonperforming loans problems
almost simultaneously in the early 1990s. Sweden disposed of bad loans aggressively in
1992–1994, and then attained a V-shaped economic recovery in the middle of the 1990s,
while Japan postponed the disposal of nonperforming loans and its debt-ridden economy
experienced slow growth that lasted a decade.
264 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a model in which a collateral-secured loan is used to smooth
consumption intertemporally and also used as a payment instrument, i.e., liquidity, in-
tratemporally. We show that the interaction between the two roles of collateral lending
causes multiple steady-state equilibria to exist. The role of liquidity to mitigate the
search friction in the decentralized market plays the key role to generate the multiple
equilibria. In our basic model, there are two stable steady states, one of which is a bad
equilibrium where the asset price collapses and the decentralized matching market is
disrupted due to a shortage of liquidity. In the bad equilibrium, the land price is low
and the intratemporal debt, i.e., liquidity, dries up because of the shortage of collateral.
Consequently, the decentralized matching market is shut down, since sellers choose not
to participate in the market facing buyers’ liquidity shortage. This market disruption
lowers the aggregate productivity, while the low productivity justiﬁes the low asset prices
in turn. The asset price is lower and the debt/asset ratio, bt/(at+1K), is higher in the
bad equilibrium. Therefore, a policy implication for ﬁnancial crisis management is that
if the government imposes the restriction that all impatient agents must set their debt
burden, bt, such that bt ≤ at+1kt − phqh, the crisis state is then eliminated and the
economy may jump to the normal state. This result seems to support the eﬀectiveness
of debt reduction policy as ﬁnancial crisis management. Thus our analysis in this paper
may shed some light on the assessment of policies for ﬁnancial crisis management that
are explicitly concerned with asset prices and the aggregate amount of debt.
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A Appendix
In this Appendix, we conﬁrm that our results in the previous section hold even if we
introduce money into our model. As is the case for Carlstrom and Fuerst’s (1997) model,
the setting of our model with two diﬀerent types of agents, patient and impatient, implies
that impatient agents do not hold cash for payment in a steady-state equilibrium. In
this Appendix, we consider a slightly stronger form of money than cash. We conﬁrm
that money does not matter for our results in a modiﬁed version of our model in which
we introduce deposit money that can earn interest.
We assume that agents can hold intertemporal bank deposits that earn interest at
the rate rd
t, instead of bonds. Impatient agents can use the principal and interest from
their deposits as a payment instrument in the decentralized market in addition to the
bank notes that they borrow from banks.
A.1 Optimization of patient agents
Since patient agents hold bank deposit, dt, instead of bonds, bt, we get the Bellman
equations for our monetary model by substituting dt and rd
t for bt and rt in the previous
30section. Note that dt is measured in the units of the date-(t + 1) consumption good.









+ lt + βV p(dt). (86)
Similar arguments as those in the previous section imply
β(1 + rd
t) = 1. (87)
A.2 Optimization of impatient agents
Since impatient agents can hold bank deposits, d′
t, as their assets, we need to include d′
t
as the state variables. In this modiﬁed model, impatient agents borrow intertemporal
loans, bt, from banks instead of borrowing from patient agents directly. The interest rate
for bt is rt, where rt ≥ rd











t−1 + atkt−1 − ptqt, (89)
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t is the total of bank notes and deposits that the impatient agent brings into the


















− bt−1 + β′V (lt,bt,d′
t,kt), (92)
subject to bt + Rtlt ≤ at+1kt + d′
t. FOCs and envelope conditions for bt and d′
t imply
1 = (1 + rt)ξt + β′(1 + rt)(1 + α(µt+1)µt+1xt+1), (93)
1 ≥ β′(1 + rd
t){1 + α(µt+1)µt+1[Rt+1 + Rt+1xt+1 − 1]}, (94)
31where d′
t = 0 if (94) holds with strong inequality. Therefore, equations (93) and (94)
imply that d′
t = 0 if Rt+1 = 1 and rd
t < rt, which, we will show below, is the case in the
equilibrium.
A.3 Optimization of banks
Banks accept deposits dt from patient agents and d′
t from impatient agents, and invest
them into intertemporal lending bt and the real cash reserve mt under a technological
constraint that total deposits8 cannot exceed ϕmt where ϕ (ϕ > 1) is a technological
parameter for production of payment services. The optimization problem of a bank in
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where πt is the inﬂation rate. Note that lt denotes the bank notes lent to impatient





t)ϕ + (1 + πt)−1 − (1 + rt)]mt + (Rt − 1)lt. (98)
Since lt < ∞ and mt < ∞ in the equilibrium,
Rt = 1, (99)
1 + rt =
β−1ϕ − (1 + πt)−1
ϕ − 1
. (100)
As long as 1+πt ≥ β, rt exceeds rd
t = β−1 −1, and therefore, d′
t = 0 from (93) and (94).
It is easily shown that qualitatively the same results as those in Section 2 hold for the
8Here we make a slightly problematic assumption that the intraperiod bank notes, lt, that the bank
issues in the day market are not constrained by cash holdings of the bank. Otherwise the constraint (97)
would be dt+d
′
t+lt · ϕmt and the intraperiod rate of interest would exceed one, that is, Rt > 1. In this
case, the analysis would be complicated and our results would hold only for a certain range of parameter
values. For simplicity, we assume in this paper that the constraint for the bank is (97).








Figure 1: Determination of the measure of participating patient agents in Normal State
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